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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ANTI-GANG LEGISLATION
BETH BJERREGAARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Street gangs are thought by many to present a clear threat to
public safety.' As Jeffery Mayer states, "gangs are routinely por-
trayed as an alien presence in otherwise stable communities.
2
Gangs are now thought to be heavily armed with a sophisticated
array of weaponry. 3 Urban street gangs are associated with the
drug trade and an increase in homicides in many areas.4 Law
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enforcement agencies and courts have been largely frustrated by
attempts to control the problem through the application of tradi-
tional criminal laws. 5
As a result, state legislatures have drafted new legislation
aimed specifically at addressing the problem of criminal street
gangs. In 1988, California became the first state to pass anti-gang
legislation with the enactment of the California Street Terrorism
Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP). The act primarily
makes it a crime to engage in criminal gang activity.6 It estab-
lishes that "any person who actively participates in any criminal
street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully
promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by
members of that gang" shall be guilty of a criminal offense.7 Sen-
tence enhancements are possible for gang members involved in
criminal activity and for gang members who commit felonies on or
near school grounds.8 The legislation establishes a nuisance pro-
vision which targets buildings or places utilized by gang members
for criminal activities, and penalizes coercing gang participation. 9
Several other states quickly followed suit enacting legislation
modeled after the California S.T.E.P. Act.10 Some states have
criminalized more specific gang activities such as recruitment and
solicitation," gang intimidation,' 2 and gang drive-bys. 13 These
5. Id., at 685; James Blake Sibley, Gang Violence: Response of the Criminal
Justice System to the Growing Threat, 11 CRIM. JUST. J. 403, 406 (1989). In
particular, Sibley mentions the difficulties prosecutors encounter when trying to
prosecute gang-related crimes such as witness intimidation, juvenile codes, etc.
6. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-.28 (West Supp. 1998).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West Supp. 1998).
8. § 186.22(b)(2).
9. § 186.22a(a).
10. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308 (West Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
74-102 (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.20-28 (West 1997); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-15-1 to -5 (1996); ILL. COMP. STAT. 147/15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1996);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-9-1 to -4 (Michie Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 723A.1-2 (West Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1401-1405 (West 1992);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.229 (West Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-44-3
(Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.421-430 (West 1995); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 193.168(1992); N.D. CRIM. CODE 12.1-06.2-03 (Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-10-14 to -15 (Michie Supp. 1996).
11. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.160 (Michie 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-74-201
to -203 (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.26 (West 1997); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 874.05 (West 1994); ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/12-6.1 (West Supp. 1996); IowA
CODE ANN. § 723A.3 (West Supp. 1996); N.D. CRIM. CODE § 12.1-06.2-03 (Supp.
[Vol. 21:31
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statutes provided prosecutors with a wider array of tools to utilize
when prosecuting gang members. In addition, they allow the
courts to directly attack the problem of gang membership and not
simply the "manifestation of the gang problem" or the criminal
acts engaged in by gang members.' 4
The purpose of this article is to examine the constitutionality
of anti-gang legislation within the context of the First Amend-
ment. Specifically, the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth
and the related issue of freedom of association will be examined
with respect to statutory provisions which criminalize gang
participation.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO ANTI-GANG LAws
A. The Doctrine of Vagueness
The vagueness doctrine derives from the due process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. A statute is considered
to be unconstitutionally vague if persons "of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion." 5 The purpose of this doctrine is to ensure that citizens are
given fair warning as to what types of behaviors are proscribed by
the statute. Furthermore, law enforcement officers are provided
with clear standards of enforcement that limit discretion and
avoid arbitrary and discriminatory application of the law.' 6 The
Supreme Court has concluded that unduly vague statutes can
have a "chilling" effect on speech and/or freedom of association, as
citizens may simply refrain from exercising their rights to free
speech or association rather than risk violating a statute that they
cannot interpret.' 7 Although the Court has made it clear that the
vagueness doctrine is not meant to impose impossible standards of
specificity on legislatures,' 8 statutes which hold the potential to
1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 21,856 (West Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 941.38 (West 1996).
12. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-9-4 (Michie 1994).
13. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74-107 (Michie 1997).
14. Truman, supra note 3, at 706.
15. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
16. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
17. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963).
18. United States v. Petrilla, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
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infringe on constitutionally protected activity may require greater
precision and are generally more closely scrutinized.1 9
There are several techniques that have been employed by leg-
islatures that attempt to mitigate or preclude vagueness chal-
lenges in anti-gang legislation. One of the more common methods
has been to require active participation in the gang accompanied
by knowledge of the gangs' criminal behavior.2 ° This requirement
ensures that only members who are aware of the gangs' criminal
activities and who actively participate in these enterprises are
punished. Members who are either unaware of the gangs' crimi-
nal involvement or who are nothing more than passive members
will not fall within the scope of the statute.
Another frequently utilized method of avoiding vagueness
challenges is to impose a specific intent requirement. 21 A scienter
element both limits law enforcement discretion and narrows the
potential reach of the statute.22 A common requirement is that the
act be committed with the intent to "promote, further or assist the
criminal conduct of the gang."23 A third method is to narrowly
define critical terms in the statutes. Legislatures have taken
19. Berg, supra note 1, at 470.
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-28 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-1
to -5 (1996); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-9-1 to (Michie Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 723A.1-2 (West Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.421-430 (West 1995);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.168 (Michie 1992). For example, the California statute
that most are modeled after requires that the individual "actively participates in
any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal activity..." (CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West
1997)).
21. Axiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308 (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 186.20-28 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-1 to -5 (1996); ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 147/15 (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-9-1 to -4 (Michie
Supp. 1996); IowA CODE ANN. § 723A.1-2 (West Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 15:1401-1405 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.229 (West Supp. 1997);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-44-3 (Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.421-430 (West
1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.168 (1992); N.D. CRIM. CODE § 12.1-06.2-03 (Supp.
1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-10-14 to -15 (Michie Supp. 1996).
22. Berg, supra note 1, at 472. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
23. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308 (West Supp. 1996) (Intent to promote
or further criminal objectives of syndicate); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-28 (West
1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-1 to -5 (1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.229 (West
Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.421-430 (West 1995); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 193.168 (1992); N.D. CRIM. CODE § 12.1-06.2-03 (Supp. 1995).
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great pains to carefully construct anti-gang statutes.2 4 All the
statutes examined herein expressly define the term "criminal
street gang."25 Similarly, several of the statutes define what is
meant by the term "gang member"2 6 and a "pattern of criminal
activity."2 7
B. The Doctrine of Overbreadth
The overbreadth doctrine is also related to First Amendment
freedoms. A statute is considered to be overbroad if in addition to
the undesirable behavior, it includes constitutionally protected
activities, especially those related to free expression or free associ-
ation.2" As with vague laws, statutes that are overbroad may
deter citizens from practicing their First Amendment rights and
24. Although the court has held that any undefined terminology should be
understood according to "common meanings or through reference to legislative
history or judicial interpretations of the provisions" Silvija A. Strikis, Note,
Stopping Stalking, 81 GEO. L.J., 2771, 2791 (1993).
25. Although there are varying definitions employed most are similar to
California's definition which designates "any ongoing organization, association or
group of three or more persons , whether formal or informal, having as one of its
primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts
enumerated, having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and
whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a
pattern of criminal gang activity." CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(f) (West 1997).
26. A gang member is typically defined as "a person who engages in a pattern
of criminal street gang activity and who meets two or more of a list of
enumerated criteria" most often including self-admission, identification by a
parent/guardian, information from a reliable informant or an informant plus
corroboration, physical evidence, photographs, tattoos, clothing style, colors,
residing in an area frequented by gang members, use of hand signs, and being
stopped in the company of or arrested with gang members a number of times.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-105(8) (West Supp. 1996). See also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 874.03(2) (West 1994); 740 ILL. COATP. STAT. 147/10 (West Supp. 1996); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-44-3(c) (Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-10-14(2)
(Supp. 1996).
27. A pattern of criminal activity is typically defined as "the commission of,
attempted commission of, or solicitation of, or sustained juvenile petition for, or
conviction of two or more of the following offenses, proving at least one of these
offenses occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of those
offenses occurred within three years after the prior offense and the offenses were
committed on separate occasions or by two or more persons." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 186.22(e) (West 1997). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. 874.03(3) (West 1994); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-15-3(3) (1996); IowA CODE ANN. § 723A.1.3 (West Supp. 1993);
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:1404(B) (West 1992); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 578.421 (2) (West
1995); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-10-14(3) (Michie Supp. 1996).
28. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
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may grant law enforcement officials too much discretion, leading
to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.29 In First Amendment
cases, where legislation is aimed at proscribing conduct and not
pure speech, the Supreme Court has held that the overbreadth
must not only be real, but must also be substantial when com-
pared to lawful applications before a statute will be struck down
as unconstitutional.3 0 Since anti-gang legislation criminalizes
activities which promote or assist a criminal street gang, chal-
lenges alleging overbreadth will be held to this heightened level of
scrutiny.
The doctrine of overbreadth is unique in that it also holds
procedural implications. Contrary to the usual rules of standing,
defendants challenging a statute as overly broad may not only
challenge the statute as it applies to their own conduct, but may
also claim that the statute violates the First Amendment rights of
others.3 1
The argument set forth is that anti-gang laws are overbroad
because they infringe on citizens' First Amendment freedoms of
association.3 2 Traditionally, the Supreme Court "has confined
freedom of association protection to groups engaged in some form
of First Amendment activity" such as speech, assembly, religious
worship, political advocacy, etc.33 The Court has recognized a
right of citizens to enter into and maintain certain intimate rela-
tionships free from undue intrusion by the state. However, this
right has generally been limited to the context of family rela-
tions4.3  The Court has stated that the right to associate extends
to associations which "pertain to the social, legal, and economic
benefit of the members." 3' Although it could be argued that this
29. Scott v. District Attorney, 309 F.Supp. 833, 838 (E.D. La. 1970). See also,
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 150 (1974) (Marshall J., dissenting) (an
overbroad statute "hangs over their heads like a Sword of Damocles... the value
of a sword of Damocles is that it hangs - not that it drops.").
30. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
31. Id. at 611.
32. Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues For Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 739, 776 (1990); Alexander A. Molina, Comment, California's Anti-
Gang Street Terrorism Enforcement And Prevention Act: One Step Forward, Two
Steps Back?, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 457, 462-469 (1993). See also Berg, supra note 1,
at 488 (this argument has also been made with respect to anti-gang loitering
laws).
33. Roberts v. United States Jaycees 468 U.S. 609, 617-618 (1984). Boga,
supra note 1, at 495.
34. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620, Anderson, supra note 1, at 530.
35. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
[Vol. 21:31
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latter application may apply to gang-like associations,36 the
Supreme Court has rejected similar claims in the past holding
that groups like the Jaycees did not qualify as intimate
associations.37
The Court has failed to recognize a general right to "social
association."3" However, the Court has declared that mere mem-
bership in an association cannot be criminalized.3 s In fact, some
have argued that the First Amendment protects "the right to asso-
ciate with others even if they are engaged in criminal activity."40
Although this may seemingly apply to the gang situation, it is
important to note that First Amendment rights to associate are
not absolute. Some argue that the gang's criminal conduct "dis-
solves any associational rights."4 ' In fact the Supreme Court in
United States v. Choate stated that "the practice of associating
with compatriots in crime is not a protected associational right."
42
Thus it appears that the Supreme Court will be reluctant to recog-
nize gang membership as an activity protected by the First
Amendment freedom of association.
Claims regarding freedom of association are examined under
the doctrine of strict scrutiny, meaning that the statutes must
further a compelling governmental interest and must employ the
least restrictive means of accomplishing that objective.43 In an
attempt to preclude overbreadth challenges, several states have
written compelling interests into the preambles of their statutes.
For example, California legislation asserts that:
The State of California is in a state of crisis which has been caused
by violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize and
commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful citizens of their
neighborhood. These activities, both individually and collectively,
36. Molina, supra note 33, at 462-466.
37. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-620. See also, City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S.
19, 25 (1989). But cf Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-523 (1960)
(Holding groups that engage in some form of protected first amendment activity
can receive protection.).
38. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25.
39. Holland, supra note 40, at 295; People v. Rodriquez, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d
660,664 (1993); Burrell, supra note 33, at 777; Molina, supra note 33, at 465.
40. Truman, supra note 3, at 716.
41. Lisa Rein, Note, Washington State Exceptional Sentences For Gang
Members: An Analysis of State v. Johnson, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 411, 422 (1994/95).
42. United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 181 (9th Cir. 1978).
43. NAACP. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
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present a clear and present danger to public order and safety and
are not constitutionally protected.44
Similarly the Colorado statute maintains that "the prolifera-
tion of gangs and gang-related crimes.. .has become a matter of
statewide concern."4 5 The Arkansas law states that it is "exper-
iencing an increase in crime committed by criminal gangs.. ." and
that "criminal gangs, organizations, and enterprises control their
market areas by terrorizing the peaceful citizens in their neigh-
borhood with deliberate and random acts of violence."46 Legisla-
tion in Arkansas, California and Florida all contend that "it is the
right of every person. . .to be secure and protected from fear,
intimidation and physical harm caused by the activities of violent
groups and individuals."4 7 These laws state up front that the
states have a compelling interest in preventing criminal street
gang activity.48
In addition to examining statutes for a compelling state inter-
est, courts evaluating overbreadth claims will also "analyze the
statute in light of any limiting constructions that the statutes
employ."49 One common method utilized by states to mitigate
challenges of overbreadth is to explicitly exclude constitutionally
protected activity from the scope of the statute. For example,
anti-gang legislation for the states of Arkansas, California, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Illinois and Louisiana proclaim that their General
Assemblies recognize "the right of every citizen to harbor and con-
stitutionally express beliefs on any lawful subjects whatsoever, to
associate lawfully with others who share similar beliefs, to peti-
tion lawfully constituted authority for redress of perceived griev-
ances and to participate in the electoral process", and that "it is
not the intent of this subchapter to interfere with the constitu-
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 1997). See also, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 874.02(2) (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-15-2(b) (1996); 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 147/5(d) (West Supp. 196); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1402(B) (West 1992).
Florida, Georgia, Illinois and Louisiana all state that they are in a "state of crisis
which has been caused by violent street gangs" and that these gangs are
presenting a clear and present danger to the community. Id.
45. COL. REV. STAT. § 24-33.5-415.3 (West 1996).
46. ARK. CODE ANN § 5-74-102 (Michie Supp. 1995).
47. Ark. Code Ann. 5-74-102(a) (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE 186.21
(West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.02 (1) (West Supp. 1997).
48. Id.
49. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
[Vol. 21:31
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tional exercise of the protected rights and freedoms of expression
and association."50
Thus, in many instances, legislatures attempt to address
overbreadth a priori by explicitly indicating a compelling state
interest and maintaining that the statutes do not infringe upon
constitutionally protected rights. It should be noted that the
methods utilized by legislatures to avoid vagueness challenges
also help to mitigate overbreadth challenges. Requiring active
participation along with knowledge of the group's criminal activi-
ties and imposing a specific intent requirement narrows the poten-
tial reach of the statute.
III. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE: ANALYSIS OF APPELLATE
COURT DECISIONS
Eleven appellate court decisions handed down between 1991
and 1998 are analyzed in the accompanying tables. Table 1
presents a summary of the opinions and holdings in each of these
cases. The cases are arranged chronologically with the most
recent cases presented last. The table indicates the type of chal-
lenge presented (vagueness/overbreadth) and the court ruling
with regard to that issue. In addition, if the appellant proffered a
vagueness challenge the exact terminology that was challenged is
delineated. If the appellant challenged the statute as overbroad,
the table indicates whether or not the court held that the statute
implicated the constitutional right to freedom of association, and
whether or not the court recognized a compelling state interest
that was served by the anti-gang statutes. The last several col-
umns of the table denote whether the court recognized any of the
limiting elements employed by legislatures as important in
assessing both vagueness and/or overbreadth challenges.
A. Vagueness Challenges
Thus far, eleven cases have challenged anti-gang legislation
as void for vagueness. 51 Eight of those cases challenged state leg-
50. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74-102(a) (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 186.21 (West Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.02(1) (West Supp. 1997); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-15-2(a) (1996); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 147/5(a) (West Supp.1996);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 1402(A) (West 1992).
51. See State v. Baldenegro, 932 P.2d 275 (Ariz. App. 1996); State v. McCoy,
928 P.2d 647 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1018 (1997); In re Alberto R., 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 348 (1991); People v. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1991); People v. Green,
278 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1991); City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259 (Ill. App.
9
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islation52 and two challenged city ordinances.53 Only the two
cases challenging city ordinances were held to have merit by the
courts. In both cases the courts struck down the entire statute as
being both vague and overbroad.5 4 None of the vagueness chal-
lenges to state legislation were sustained. State appellants chal-
lenged a variety of terms including "actively participates",55
"criminal street gang,"5" "knowledge of pattern of criminal gang
activity",5 7 "willfully promotes, furthers or assists in any felonious
criminal conduct", 8 and membership.59 The various courts held
that each of these terms was specific enough to withstand consti-
tutional challenge. Therefore, it appears that states have avoided
vagueness challenges by specifically defining key terminology
within the context of the statute.
1996); City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34 (Ill. App. 1995); Klein v.
State, 698 N.E.2d 296 (Ind. 1998); Jackson v. State, 634 N.E.2d 532 (Ind. App.
1994); Helton v. State, 624 N.E.2d 499 (Ind. App. 1993), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct.
1252 (1997); State v. Walker, 506 N.W.2d 430 (Iowa 1993).
52. See, Baldenegro, 932 P.2d at 275; McCoy, 928 P.2d at 647; Alberto, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 348; Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 894; Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 140;
Walker, 506 N.W.2d at 430; Jackson, 634 N.E.2d at 532; Helton, 624 N.E.2d at
499.
53. See Gaut, 660 N.E.2d at 259; Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d at 34.
54. The City of Harvard made it unlawful for "any person within the City to
wear known gang colors, emblems, or other insignia, or appear to be engaged in
communicating gang-related messages through the use of hand signals or other
means of communication" Gaut, 660 N.E.2d at 259, 260. The Chicago ordinance
provides that "whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably
believes to be a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with
one or more other persons, he shall order all persons to disperse and remove
themselves from the area. Any person who does not promptly obey such an order
is in violation of this section" Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d at 34, 36. It is obvious that
neither jurisdiction employed any of the limiting elements utilized by state
legislatures.
55. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 145.
56. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 901; Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
57. Id. at 147.
58. Alberto, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348, 356; Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 148; Walker,
506 N.W.2d at 432 ("willfully aids and abets any criminal act committed for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in assciaction with any criminal street gang.").
59. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 902; Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 145-146.
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B. Overbreadth Challenges
Seven appellate cases have challenged state statutes as over-
broad 60 and two cases have challenged city ordinances.6 1 Again,
the two challenged city ordinances were struck in their entirety,
not only for vagueness, but also for violating the overbreadth doc-
trine. However, none of the challenges to the state statutes were
supported by the courts. Significantly, the courts failed to recog-
nize that these statutes infringed on citizens' freedoms of associa-
tion.62  Importantly, most of the courts have recognized the
importance of the limiting techniques employed by legislatures.
The most frequently mentioned techniques were the requirements
of active participation with knowledge63 and specific intent.64
Likewise, the courts acknowledged the importance of declaring a
compelling state interest,65 excluding constitutionally protected
activities,66 and defining key terminology.67
Interestingly, the majority of the time, the courts refused to
examine the facial validity of the statutes, citing either the fact
that these statutes required the state to show "aiding and abetting
in an actual criminal act" not mere association 61 or that in it was
clear that the defendants' conduct fell within the range of conduct
proscribed by the statute and therefore he/she could only chal-
lenge the statute as it applied to him or her specifically. 69 The
state of Indiana essentially refused to consider this issue stating
that "an overbreadth analysis under the U.S. Constitution is not
applicable to the Indiana Constitution."7 ° Therefore, once the
Indiana court determines that the statute is capable of constitu-
60. Baldenegro, 932 P.2d at 275; McCoy, 928 P.2d at 647;Alberto, 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 348; Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 894; Walker, 506 N.W.2d at 430; Jackson,
634 N.E.2d at 532; Helton, 624 N.E.2d at 499.
61. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d at 259; Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d at 34.
62. Jackson, 634 N.E.2d at 536; Helton, 624 N.E.2d at 508-509.
63. McCoy, 928 P.2d at 650; Walker, 506 N.W.2d at 432; Jackson, 634 N.E.2d
536; Helton, 624 N.E.2d at 511.
64. Baldenegro, 932 P.2d at 275; McCoy, 928 P.2d at 647; Alberto, 1
Cal.Rptr.2d at 348; Klein, 698 N.E.2d at 296; Jackson, 634 N.E.2d at 532;
Helton, 624 N.E.2d at 499.
65. Alberto, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d at 348.
66. Id.
67. Id.; Baldenegro, 932 P.2d at 275; Walker, 506 N.W.2d at 430.
68. See Baldenegro, 932 P.2d at 275; McCoy, 928 P.2d at 647; Alberto, 1
Cal.Rptr.2d at 357; Walker, 506 N.W.2d at 433.
69. Baldenegro, 932 P.2d at 279.
70. Jackson, 634 N.E.2d at 532, 536,.
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tional application, it then focuses on whether or not the statute
was constitutionally applied in the case under review. 7' In both
appellate cases examined by the Court of Appeals of Indiana, the
court held that the anti-gang legislation was capable of constitu-
tional application and that the statute applied only to activities
that were not protected by the First Amendment.72
IV. UNIQUE DIFFICULTIES OF ANTI-GANG LEGISLATION
One commentator insightfully recognized that "for a statute
to have a reasonable expectation of achieving its intended goal,
those crafting it must have knowledge of the behavior they are
attempting to alter."7 3 There are several areas related to gang
membership and gang activity in which it appears that legisla-
tures have not fully explored what it means to criminalize these
behaviors.
Social science researchers have been plagued by definitional
issues since they began formally studying gangs in the 1920s. In
fact, researchers have yet to agree on a single definition for this
complex phenomenon. 74 To further complicate matters, law
71. Id. at 536.
72. Id. at 563; Helton, 624 N.E.2d at 507.
73. Holland, supra note 40, at 278.
74. One of the earliest definitions of a gang was developed by FREDERICK
THRASHER, THE GANG, 46 (1963), who defined a gang as an "interstitial group,
originally formed spontaneously, and then integrated through conflict. It is
characterized by the following types of behaviors: meeting face to face, milling,
movement through space as a unit, conflict, and planning. The result of this
collective behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective internal
structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group awareness, and attachment
to a local territory. Id. Subsequently, MALCOLM W. KLEIN, STREET GANGS AND
STREET WORKERS 13 (1971) specified a gang as "any denotable adolescent group
of youngsters who (a) are generally perceived as a distinct aggregation by others
in their neighborhood, (b) recognize themselves as a denotable group (almost
invariably with a group name) and (c) have been involved in a sufficient number
of delinquent incidents to call forth a consistent negative response from
neighborhood residents and/or enforcement agencies. Id. WALTER B. MILLER,
VIOLENCE BY YouTH GANGS AND YouTH GROUPs AS A CRIME PROBLEM IN MAJOR
AMERICAN CITIES 9 (1975), concluded that "a gang is a group of recurrently
associating individuals with identifiable leadership and internal organization,
identifying with or claiming control over territory in the community, and
engaging either individually or collectively in violent or other forms of illegal
behavior". Id. Mdre recently, William B. Sanders, Gangbangs and Drive-bys:
Grounded Culture and Juvenile Gang Violence, in SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL
ISSUES 20 (Best J. ed. 1994), stated that "A youth gang is any transpersonal
group of youths that shows a willingness to use deadly violence to claim and
13
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enforcement professionals and sociologists often employ vastly dif-
ferent definitions of gangs and gang activity. 75 Researchers have
suggested that if these definitions vary, estimates of gang-related
violence will also vary.76 Since legislative wording assumes that
one can only be punished if he/she is a member of a gang, it is
critical to reach a consensus on the definition of a gang.
Defining gang membership presents a similar problem.
"Under Florida and South Dakota laws, a person could potentially
meet the statutory definition of a gang member simply by living in
a gang area, associating with known gang members, and being
stopped in the company of gang members more than four times. '77
Such legislation could benefit from the expertise of gang research-
ers who recognize that there are varying levels of participation in
gangs and that membership in some types of gangs is ambigu-
ous. 78 Researchers have discovered that gang membership is a rel-
atively unstable phenomenon with persons often drifting in and
out of gang involvement.79 Malcolm Klein proposes that there are
defend territory, and attack rival gangs, extort or rob money, or engage in other
criminal behavior as an activity associated with its group, and is recognized by
itself and its immediate community as a distinct dangerous entity. The basic
structure of gangs is one of age and gender differentiation, and leadership is
informal and multiple". Id. While the Chicago Crime Commission, utilized the
following definition: "A street gang is a cohesive group, most members being
between the ages of eleven and twenty-three years, who have recognizable
geographical territory (usually defined with graffiti), leadership, a purpose, and
various levels of an organized, continuous course of criminal activities." CHICAGO
CRIME COMMISSION, GANGS: PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE 75 YEARS OF FIGHTING
CRIME IN CHICAGOLAND 5 (1995)
75. See Richard A. Ball'& G. D. Curry, The Logic of Definition in Criminology:
Purposes and Methods for Defining "Gangs", 33 CRIMINOLOGY 225-245 (1995);
Jeffrey J. Mayer, Individual Moral Responsibility and the Criminalization of
Youth Gangs, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 951-954, 956-958, 965-974 (1993);
Burrell, supra note 33, at 746-751; Cheryl L. Maxson and Malcolm W. Klein,
Street Gang Violence: Twice as Great, or Half as Great?, in GANGS IN AMERICA 71-
102 (Huff C. ed., 1st ed. 1990).
76. Cheryl L. Maxson & Malcolm W. Klein, Defining Gang Homicide: An
Updated Look at Member and Motive Approaches, in GANGS IN AMERICA 3, 9
(Huff C. ed., 2d ed. 1996).
77. Truman, supra note 3, at 717.
78. Herbert C. Covey, et.al., Juvenile Gangs, 12 (1992).
79. Finn-Aage Esbensen and David Huizinga, Gangs, Drugs, and Delinquency
in a Survey of Urban Youth, 31 CRIMINOLOGY, 565, 570, 575 (1993); Terence P.
Thornberry, et.al., The Role of Juvenile Gangs in Facilitating Delinquent
Behavior, 30 J. OF RES. IN CRIME AND DELINQ., 55, 65-66, 82 (1993). Other
researchers have also found that gang membership was a transient phenomenon,
and that many gangs were loosely organized (Covey, supra note 79, at 12; Daniel
[Vol. 21:31
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several different types of gang members including; core members,
associates, peripheral or fringe members, and wannabes or
recruits whose commitment and participation in the group var-
ies.80 Anti-gang legislation has the potential to punish defendants
twice for the same act; once for the act itself and once for commit-
ting the act for the benefit of the gang. Thus, legislatures must be
careful to proscribe only delinquent behaviors of gang members
who are committed, active participants in the gang. Statutory
definitions should be careful not to encompass "fringe members"
or "wannabes" for example, and avoid imposing the law on those
who are not full participants in the gang.
One last area of difficulty for prosecution of defendants under
anti-gang legislation is demonstrating a pattern of gang activity.
As noted previously, most statutes require the defendant to par-
ticipate in "two or more of the enumerated offenses, providing at
least one of these offenses occurred after the effective date of this
chapter and the last of those offenses occurred within three years
after a prior offense and the offenses were committed on separate
occasions or by two or more persons."8' Logically, one would
assume that the term "pattern" means that the defendant had a
practice of committing delinquent acts, or at the very least, had
done so on at least two occasions. However, courts have concluded
that a "pattern of criminal activity" can be established by demon-
strating that the defendant was involved in two or more incidents
or by demonstrating that multiple offenders committed one or
more offenses in a single incident.8 2 If the defendant commits an
act with other gang members that can be classified as two sepa-
rate criminal offenses, then this defendant will have demon-
strated a pattern of gang activity in keeping with the statute's
definition. For example, if two gang members break into a home
and steal a television (breaking and entering, burglary, larceny),
J. Monti, Origins and Problems of Gang Research in the United States, in GANGS
9-10 (Cummings S.& Monti D. eds. 1993).
80. Malcolm W. Klein, The American Street Gang: Its Nature, Prevalence,
and Control 59 (1995); See also Irving Spergel, Youth Gangs: Continuity and
Change, in CRIME AND DELINQUENCY: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 199-
201, 205 (Morris N. ed. Vol. 12 1990); J.M. HAGEDORN, PEOPLE AND FOLKS 90
(1989).
81. See supra note 28.
82. The following cases examined the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the charge and establishing a pattern of criminal activity. In re Nathaniel C.,279
Cal.Rptr. 236 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); In re Lincoln J., 272 Cal.Rptr. 852 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990); In re Leland D., 272 Cal.Rptr. 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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they will each be judged to have demonstrated a pattern of "crimi-
nal activity." Allowing this element of the offense to be estab-
lished by concurrent activities appears to violate the spirit of the
law which is seemingly designed to punish defendants who evi-
dence their dangerousness through repeated violations of the law.
Further, even if prosecutors establish a pattern of gang activ-
ity by demonstrating two separate criminal actions by the defend-
ant, the Supreme Court of California has held that both offenses
do not have to be "gang related." 3 Essentially, this means that in
California a juvenile who has sustained a previous juvenile peti-
tion prior to gang involvement will be eligible for prosecution
under the S.T.E.P. once it is demonstrated that he/she has com-
mitted one of the enumerated crimes, regardless of whether this
individual acted alone or in the company of other gang members.
Again, it is difficult to assert that one illegal act committed with-
out accompaniment establishes a pattern of criminal activity.
CONCLUSION
Overall, it appears that appellate courts will uphold the con-
stitutionality of anti-gang legislation. Courts have recognized the
relevance of employing limiting elements such as specific intent
and requiring knowledgeable active participation in the construc-
tion of the statutes. It is also important to clearly define key ter-
minology within the statutes. Likewise, it is important that
legislation delineates compelling state interests and an intent not
to infringe upon constitutionally protected freedoms.
Nonetheless, legislatures should continue to strive to create a
workable definition of both "criminal street gang" and "gang mem-
ber" as well as "gang-related crime." This is critical to ensuring
that a citizen's substantive due process rights are protected and
that their procedural rights are preserved. Ambigous definitions
that fail to incorporate sociological interpretations of the gang
phenomenon introduce the potential that juveniles who lack com-
mitment to the gang and/or who are not active members will be
inappropriately caught within the scope of the statute. Since
research has shown that repeated law enforcement interventions
may in fact hold criminogenic effects for potential gang mem-
bers,8 4 efforts should ensure that the law targets appropriately.
83. People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713,716 (Cal. 1996).
84. Felix Padilla, Becoming a Gang Member, in IN THEIR OWN WORDS:
CRIMINALS ON CRIME 130-147 (Cromwell P. ed., 1986).
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Likewise, legislatures need to consider their definitions of "pat-
tern of gang activity" and perhaps modify these definitions to
reflect behaviors that clearly demonstrate repeated activities, and
thus truly establish a pattern.
Further, it is doubtful that the use of an anti-gang statute
always represents the least restrictive alternative. Although not
yet challenged, it appears that unlawful activities covered by the
statutes could also be addressed by traditional criminal laws such
as aiding and abetting in a criminal offense, conspiracy, solicita-
tion, loitering, etc. Prosecutors should be careful to ensure that
they are using the least restrictive and appropriate means to han-
dle these cases.
Lastly, legislatures should work in concert with social science
researchers to incorporate current knowledge regarding street
gangs into the legislative schemes designed to eliminate or control
them. In this way, one may ensure that citizens are protected
from illegal gang activity while at the same time safeguarding the
rights of defendants.
17
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